Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees

DOI10.1007/S40305-022-00446-0MaRDI QIDQ6495229zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Lei Wang, Cui Liu, Hongwei Gao, Chong Lin

Publication date 30 April 2024

Published in Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Dynamic games (91A25)

Recommendations

• The detalization of the irrational behavior proof condition
• TECHNICAL NOTE: "AN IRRATIONAL-BEHAVIOR-PROOF CONDITION IN COOPERATIVE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES"
• The D. W. K. Yeung condition for cooperative differential games with nontransferable payoffs
• The irrational behavior proof condition for linear-quadratic discrete-time dynamic games with nontransferable payoffs
• Principles of stable cooperation in stochastic games

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3617947 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 836598 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• A \(\beta\)-core existence result and its application to oligopoly markets
• A class of general transformation of characteristic functions in dynamic games
• A note on nonzero-sum differential games with bargaining solution
• Approximated cooperative equilibria for games played over event trees
• Convergence of strong time-consistent payment schemes in dynamic games
• Cores of convex games
• Definition and properties of cooperative equilibria in a two-player game of infinite duration
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Games and dynamic games
• Incentive conditions for rational behavior in discrete-time bioresource management problem
• Node-consistent core for games played over event trees
• Stochastic equilibrium programming for dynamic oligopolistic markets
• Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures
• Strongly strategic support of cooperative solutions for games over event trees
• TECHNICAL NOTE: "AN IRRATIONAL-BEHAVIOR-PROOF CONDITION IN COOPERATIVE DIFFERENTIAL GAMES"
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• The detalization of the irrational behavior proof condition
• The existence of TU -core in normal form games
• Time-consistent Shapley value for games played over event trees
• Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control

This page was built for publication: Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6495229)