Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions for Stochastic Games over Event Trees

DOI10.1007/S40305-022-00446-0MaRDI QIDQ6495229FDOQ6495229

Authors: Lei Wang, Cui Liu, Hongwei Gao, Chong Lin 

Publication date: 30 April 2024

Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Dynamic games (91A25)

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