THE CORE COINCIDES WITH THE NUCLEOLUS ALLOCATIONS IN A PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMY WITH TAXATION

DOI10.1142/S0219198909002224zbMath1190.91062OpenAlexW2111414558MaRDI QIDQ3402025

Toshiyuki Hirai

Publication date: 2 February 2010

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198909002224

zbMATH Keywords

nucleolus allocations\(T\)-coreeffective excess

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• A note on a generalization of the nucleolus to games without sidepayments
• Cost share equilibria: a Lindahlian approach
• Excess functions and nucleolus allocations of pure exchange economies
• How to share the cost of a public good
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• The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy
• Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods
• A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem
• Efficiency and Decentralization in the Pure Theory of Public Goods
• On Cores in Economies with Public Goods
• Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments
• The Ratio Equilibria and the Core of the Voting Game G(N, W) in a Public Goods Economy
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods