On the core of routing games

DOI10.1007/BF01295848zbMath0881.90139OpenAlexW3126094555WikidataQ59868867 ScholiaQ59868867MaRDI QIDQ1358628

Jeroen Kuipers, Jean J. M. Derks

Publication date: 3 July 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01295848

zbMATH Keywords

routing gamecooperative cost gamenon-emptiness of the core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Abstract computational complexity for mathematical programming problems (90C60) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (9)

Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder) ⋮ The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games ⋮ Stable solutions for multiple scenario cost allocation games with partial information ⋮ Characterizing the Shapley value in fixed-route traveling salesman problems with appointments ⋮ Enforcing fair cooperation in production-inventory settings with heterogeneous agents ⋮ On the core of cost-revenue games: minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues ⋮ On the core of routing games with revenues ⋮ A review on cost allocation methods in collaborative transportation ⋮ A note on the 5-person traveling salesman game

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• Sequencing games
• On the core of a traveling salesman cost allocation game
• The traveling salesman problem in graphs with some excluded minors
• Traveling salesman games
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Fixed-Route Cost Allocation
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Minimum cost spanning tree games
• On the core of linear production games

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