Characterizing the Shapley value in fixed-route traveling salesman problems with appointments
DOI10.1007/S00182-011-0285-7zbMATH Open1274.91104OpenAlexW2169117314MaRDI QIDQ422367FDOQ422367
Publication date: 16 May 2012
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0285-7
Recommendations
- Coincidence of cooperative game theoretic solutions in the appointment problem
- Traveling salesman games
- A study of proxies for Shapley allocations of transport costs
- Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game
- Shapley value based allocation for multi-objective cooperative problems
networkscorecost allocationShapley valueappointment gamesfixed-route traveling salesman gamesmerging and splitting proofnessrouting gamestransferable-utility games
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Games involving graphs (91A43)
Cites Work
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Traveling salesman games
- The traveling salesman game: An application of cost allocation in a gas and oil company
- Cores of convex games
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Collusion properties of values
- A characterization of the Shapley value in queueing problems
- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
- On the symmetric and weighted Shapley values
- A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem
- Axiomatization of the Shapley value on minimum cost spanning tree games
- On Scheduling Fees to Prevent Merging, Splitting, and Transferring of Jobs
- Fixed-Route Cost Allocation
- On the core of routing games
- On the core of a traveling salesman cost allocation game
- On merge properties of the Shapley value
- A note on the 5-person traveling salesman game
Cited In (4)
- Further insights into the allocation of greenhouse gas emissions to shipments in road freight transportation: the pollution routing game
- Coincidence of cooperative game theoretic solutions in the appointment problem
- A review on cost allocation methods in collaborative transportation
- Horizontal collaboration in freight transport: concepts, benefits and environmental challenges
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