Stability of strategies in payoff-driven evolutionary games on networks

DOI10.1063/1.3613924MaRDI QIDQ5264324zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Nicholas A. Mecholsky, F. Sorrentino

Publication date 27 July 2015

Published in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.6058

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Qualitative investigation and simulation of ordinary differential equation models (34C60) Stability of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing mixed strategies in which each player may act as a cooperator or a defector over a large number of interactions with a certain probability. Our model is payoff-driven, i.e., we assume that the level of accumulated payoff at each node is a relevant parameter in the selection of strategies. Also, we consider that each player chooses his/her strategy in a context of limited information. We present a deterministic nonlinear model for the evolution of strategies. We show that the final strategies depend on the network structure and on the choice of the parameters of the game. We find that polarized strategies (pure cooperator/defector states) typically emerge when (i) the network connections are sparse, (ii) the network degree distribution is heterogeneous, (iii) the network is assortative, and surprisingly, (iv) the benefit of cooperation is high.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(11)

• An intermediate number of neighbors promotes the emergence of generous tit-for-tat players on homogeneous networks
• Network topology control strategy based on spatial evolutionary public goods game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6795850 (Why is no real title available?)
• Ratcheting based on neighboring niches determines lifestyle
• Extended Pair Approximation of Evolutionary Game on Complex Networks
• Towards the role of social connectivity and aspiration level on evolutionary game
• Punishment and feedback mechanism for the evolution game on small-world network based on varying topology
• Evolutionary dynamics of strategies without complete information on complex networks
• Co-evolution of payoff strategy and interaction strategy in prisoner's dilemma game
• Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory
• Replicator dynamics on heterogeneous networks

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