Stability of strategies in payoff-driven evolutionary games on networks

DOI10.1063/1.3613924zbMATH Open1317.91004arXiv1106.6058OpenAlexW3104192825WikidataQ50606759 ScholiaQ50606759MaRDI QIDQ5264324FDOQ5264324

Nicholas A. Mecholsky, F. Sorrentino

Publication date: 27 July 2015

Published in: Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing mixed strategies in which each player may act as a cooperator or a defector over a large number of interactions with a certain probability. Our model is payoff-driven, i.e., we assume that the level of accumulated payoff at each node is a relevant parameter in the selection of strategies. Also, we consider that each player chooses his/her strategy in a context of limited information. We present a deterministic nonlinear model for the evolution of strategies. We show that the final strategies depend on the network structure and on the choice of the parameters of the game. We find that polarized strategies (pure cooperator/defector states) typically emerge when (i) the network connections are sparse, (ii) the network degree distribution is heterogeneous, (iii) the network is assortative, and surprisingly, (iv) the benefit of cooperation is high.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1106.6058

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Qualitative investigation and simulation of ordinary differential equation models (34C60) Stability of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Complex networks: structure and dynamics
• Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks
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• Community structure in social and biological networks
• Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks
• Consensus Problems in Networks of Agents With Switching Topology and Time-Delays
• Stability theory of synchronized motion in coupled-oscillator systems.
• The Evolution of Cooperation
• The stability of adaptive synchronization of chaotic systems
• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• The Influence of Social Values in Cooperation

Cited In (5)

• Extended Pair Approximation of Evolutionary Game on Complex Networks
• Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory
• Towards the role of social connectivity and aspiration level on evolutionary game
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Punishment and feedback mechanism for the evolution game on small-world network based on varying topology

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