Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.04.032zbMath1440.91009OpenAlexW2127566837WikidataQ50996897 ScholiaQ50996897MaRDI QIDQ2189312

Lindsay Browning, Andrew M. Colman

Publication date: 15 June 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2381/469

zbMATH Keywords

genetic algorithmcooperationevolutionary gamehawk-dove gametit-for-tat strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary algorithms, genetic algorithms (computational aspects) (68W50) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites Work

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• Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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