Can remembering history from predecessor promote cooperation in the next generation?
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Recommendations
- Memory does not necessarily promote cooperation in dilemma games
- MEMORY BOOSTS COOPERATION
- Historical payoff promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
- Memory-based conformity enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
- Memory mechanism with weighting promotes cooperation in the evolutionary games
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5543872 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
- An improved fitness evaluation mechanism with memory in spatial prisoner's dilemma game on regular lattices
- Behavior of collective cooperation yielded by two update rules in social dilemmas: combining Fermi and Moran rules
- Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games
- Evolution of strategies based on genetic algorithm in the iterated prisoner's dilemma on complex networks
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- The evolution of cooperation
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