Can remembering history from predecessor promote cooperation in the next generation?

DOI10.1016/J.CHAOS.2013.07.004zbMATH Open1348.91063OpenAlexW1991888431MaRDI QIDQ336246FDOQ336246

Authors: Zhi-Gang Chen, De-Gui Xiao, Yin Xu, Tao Wang 

Publication date: 10 November 2016

Published in: Chaos, Solitons and Fractals (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chaos.2013.07.004

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
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• The evolution of cooperation
• Evolution of coordinated alternating reciprocity in repeated dyadic games
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• Evolution of strategies based on genetic algorithm in the iterated prisoner's dilemma on complex networks
• Behavior of collective cooperation yielded by two update rules in social dilemmas: combining Fermi and Moran rules
• An improved fitness evaluation mechanism with memory in spatial prisoner's dilemma game on regular lattices

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