Consistency of the Shapley NTU value in \(G\)-hyperplane games
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Publication:905165
DOI10.1007/s10058-015-0172-yzbMath1329.91011OpenAlexW909533566MaRDI QIDQ905165
E. Romero-Palacios, Miguel A. Hinojosa, José Manuel Zarzuelo
Publication date: 14 January 2016
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-015-0172-y
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