On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game

DOI10.1007/s00182-013-0372-zzbMath1269.91008MaRDI QIDQ2376070

Yan-An Hwang

Publication date: 26 June 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0372-z

zbMATH Keywords

consistency; core; reduced game; converse consistency; NTU games; conditional individual rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results

Cites Work

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