Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games

DOI10.1007/s00182-012-0355-5zbMath1268.91014OpenAlexW2077703429MaRDI QIDQ1938824

Carles Rafels, Pedro Calleja, S. H. Tijs

Publication date: 25 February 2013

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/33973

zbMATH Keywords

symmetrycooperative gamescoreindividual rationalityaggregate monotonicitydummy player property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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