Shapley-Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0775-6MaRDI QIDQ404762zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eric Bahel, Christian Trudeau

Publication date 4 September 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0775-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Cost sharing with multiple technologies
• Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
• On the serial cost sharing rule
• Three methods to share joint costs or surplus

Cites work

• A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
• Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
• Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
• Nearly serial sharing methods
• On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
• Ordinal cost sharing
• Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing
• The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model

Cited in

(5)

• Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
• Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
• Cost sharing with multiple technologies
• A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation

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