Shapley-Shubik methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0775-6zbMATH Open1297.91093OpenAlexW2061278102MaRDI QIDQ404762FDOQ404762

Christian Trudeau, Eric Bahel

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0775-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
• Ordinal cost sharing
• The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model
• A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation
• Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing
• Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
• On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
• Nearly serial sharing methods

Cited In (4)

• Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
• Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?
• A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation

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