Risk capital allocation with autonomous subunits: the Lorenz set
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3733695 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- An Introduction to Allocation Rules
- An axiomatic approach to egalitarianism in TU-games
- Coherent measures of risk
- Excess based allocation of risk capital
- How should the cost of joint risk capital be allocated for performance measurement?
- Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
- Mathematical methods of game and economic theory
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- On the impossibility of fair risk allocation
- On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game
- Risk capital allocation and cooperative pricing of insurance liabilities.
- Risk capital allocation with autonomous subunits: the Lorenz set
- Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games.
- Stable allocations of risk
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The egalitarian solution and reduced game properties in convex games
- Values of Non-Atomic Games
Cited in
(6)- Optimal scenario-dependent multivariate shortfall risk measure and its application in risk capital allocation
- Risk capital allocation with autonomous subunits: the Lorenz set
- Properties and comparison of risk capital allocation methods
- How should the cost of joint risk capital be allocated for performance measurement?
- Group cohesion under individual regulatory constraints
- Capital allocation for portfolios with non-linear risk aggregation
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