The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: a strengthening of Roth's result

DOI10.1016/j.orl.2015.06.008zbMath1408.91088OpenAlexW2415214594MaRDI QIDQ1785407

Miguel Ginés-Vilar, Jaume García-Segarra

Publication date: 28 September 2018

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

symmetrymonotonicityPareto optimalitybargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ A generalization of the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

Cites Work

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• Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions
• An impossibility result concerning \(n\)-person bargaining games
• Monotonicity and independence axioms
• A class of solutions to bargaining problems
• The bargaining problem without convexity. Extending the egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions
• The Bargaining Problem
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons

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