Centrality and power in social networks: A game theoretic approach.

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Publication:1402484

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(03)00028-3zbMath1040.91089OpenAlexW2081334386WikidataQ57618747 ScholiaQ57618747MaRDI QIDQ1402484

Guillermo Owen, Enrique González-Arangüena, Mónica del Pozo, Juan Tejada, Daniel Gómez, Conrado Miguel Manuel

Publication date: 28 August 2003

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00028-3




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