"MAY I PLEASE PAY A HIGHER PRICE?": SUSTAINING NON-SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE THROUGH FREE DISPOSAL OF BARGAINING ADVANTAGE

DOI10.1142/S0219198905000673MaRDI QIDQ5716147zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Timothy Mathews

Publication date 9 January 2006

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198905000673

zbMATH Keywords

internet transactionsmarket structure and pricingnon-simultaneous exchangetransactional relationships

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Dynamic Bargaining with Transaction Costs
• Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
• The bargaining trap
• Multitrade bargaining
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade

Cites work

• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox

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