Embedded Nash Bargaining: Risk Aversion and Impatience

DOI10.1287/deca.1110.0224zbMath1398.91298OpenAlexW2155429986MaRDI QIDQ4691950

Steven A. Lippman, Kevin F. McCardle

Publication date: 24 October 2018

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/d6a660e37bc34e7c5134a28dc4e305c63b45d7ac

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingrisk aversionNash bargainingsequential decision making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Adversarial issues in reliability

Cites Work

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• Risk aversion, impatience, and optimal timing decisions
• The Bargaining Problem
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
• Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points
• Time Preference
• Characteristics of Decisions in Decision Analysis Practice
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

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