This paper studies the effects of the straight-ticket voting option (STVO) on the positions of politicians, candidate selection, and vote share. STVO allows voters to select one party for all partisan elections listed on the ballot, instead of filling out each office individually. The effects of STVO are analyzed by using a pre-election competition model. It is observed that STVO leads more partisan voters to cast straight-party ballots resulting in greater party loyalty of candidates. On the other hand, it increases the weight of non-partisan voters' positions in candidate selection. Thus, partisanship status and the positions of swing voters become more decisive determinants of vote share and the expected positions of election winners. Meanwhile, the average voter's position becomes less decisive for vote share.
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