Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology

DOI10.1007/S00355-014-0845-4MaRDI QIDQ2341121zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mohammad Reza Mirhosseini

Publication date 23 April 2015

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0845-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Recommendations

• Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
• Signaling valence in primary elections
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1
• Learning and coordination in the presidential primary system
• Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

Cites work

• A social choice lemma on voting over lotteries with applications to a class of dynamic games
• Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions

Cited in

(7)

• Electoral competition with strategic voters
• Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
• Signaling valence in primary elections
• Learning and coordination in the presidential primary system
• Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters
• The theory of straight ticket voting
• Provoking the opposition

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