Signaling valence in primary elections

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.11.008zbMATH Open1458.91074OpenAlexW3011338849MaRDI QIDQ1995468FDOQ1995468

Giovanni Andreottola

Publication date: 23 February 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp559.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

polarizationsignalingvalencepolicy extremismprimary elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Competence and Ideology
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
• Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions
• Ideological extremism and primaries
• Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality

Cited In (3)

• Ideological extremism and primaries
• Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections
• Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters

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