Signaling valence in primary elections

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.11.008MaRDI QIDQ1995468zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Giovanni Andreottola

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.csef.it/WP/wp559.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

polarizationsignalingvalencepolicy extremismprimary elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• Ideological extremism and primaries
• Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology
• Valence, complementarities, and political polarization

Cites work

• Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
• Competence and ideology
• Ideological extremism and primaries
• Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions

Cited in

(8)

• Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters
• Learning and coordination in the presidential primary system
• Elections with platform and valence competition
• Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
• Ideological extremism and primaries
• Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology
• Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections
• Primarily about primaries

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