Signaling valence in primary elections
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Publication:1995468
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.11.008zbMATH Open1458.91074OpenAlexW3011338849MaRDI QIDQ1995468FDOQ1995468
Authors: Giovanni Andreottola 
Publication date: 23 February 2021
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp559.pdf
Recommendations
- Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
- Elections with platform and valence competition
- Ideological extremism and primaries
- Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology
- Valence, complementarities, and political polarization
History, political science (91F10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Voting theory (91B12)
Cites Work
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Competence and ideology
- Mixed equilibrium in a Downsian model with a favored candidate
- Two-stage electoral competition in two-party contests: persistent divergence of party positions
- Ideological extremism and primaries
- Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
Cited In (7)
- Learning and coordination in the presidential primary system
- Elections with platform and valence competition
- Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality
- Ideological extremism and primaries
- Primaries with strategic voters: trading off electability and ideology
- Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections
- Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters
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