The apex power measure for directed networks

DOI10.1007/S003550200162MaRDI QIDQ2567955zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors René van den Brink

Publication date 14 October 2005

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550200162

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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