Some remarks on game theoretical approach to prediction of formation of parliamentary coalitions. The case of Polish elections of 1997

DOI10.1023/A:1018992611533MaRDI QIDQ1593545zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Honorata Sosnowska

Publication date 17 January 2001

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018992611533

zbMATH Keywords

modified Shapley valuepre-election pollsShapley value of games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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(1)

• Coalition cabinets in Japan (1993-1997): A game theory analysis

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