Some remarks on game theoretical approach to prediction of formation of parliamentary coalitions. The case of Polish elections of 1997

DOI10.1023/A:1018992611533zbMATH Open0966.91009OpenAlexW259457756MaRDI QIDQ1593545FDOQ1593545

Honorata Sosnowska

Publication date: 17 January 2001

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018992611533

zbMATH Keywords

modified Shapley valuepre-election pollsShapley value of games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cited In (1)

• Coalition cabinets in Japan (1993-1997): A game theory analysis

   Recommendations

• Government versus opposition: who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag? 👍 👎
• Parliamentary Coalitions: A Tour of Models 👍 👎
• Taxonomy approach to a cabinet formation problem 👍 👎
• Title not available (Why is that?) 👍 👎
• POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION 👍 👎

This page was built for publication: Some remarks on game theoretical approach to prediction of formation of parliamentary coalitions. The case of Polish elections of 1997

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1593545)