Welfare effects of foreign direct investment: Cost saving vs. Signaling

DOI10.1007/S00712-006-0224-4zbMATH Open1173.91428OpenAlexW2050880214MaRDI QIDQ877779FDOQ877779

Udo Broll, Arijit Mukherjee

Publication date: 3 May 2007

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-006-0224-4

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationinternational tradesignalingwelfareforeign direct investmentmultinational firmtrade cost

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Trade models (91B60)

Cites Work

• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

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