One-sided adaptation for infinite-horizon linear quadraticN-person non-zero-sum dynamic games and sensitivity analysis

DOI10.1080/00207170801930639zbMATH Open1151.91382OpenAlexW2037995153MaRDI QIDQ3548779FDOQ3548779

Authors: Xiaohuan Tan, Cruz, J. B. jun. 

Publication date: 17 December 2008

Published in: International Journal of Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207170801930639

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zbMATH Keywords

sensitivity analysisadaptationdiscrete-timeincomplete informationlinear quadratic\(N\)-person non-zero-sum dynamic game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Sensitivity (robustness) (93B35) Dynamic games (91A25) Discrete-time games (91A50)

Cites Work

• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
• Adaptive Control Design and Analysis

Cited In (2)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Adaptive control and signal processing literature survey (No. 7)

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