One-sided adaptation for infinite-horizon linear quadraticN-person non-zero-sum dynamic games and sensitivity analysis
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Cites work
- Adaptive Control Design and Analysis
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
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