Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance
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Publication:4033904
DOI10.2307/2297815zbMATH Open0825.90304OpenAlexW1981264908MaRDI QIDQ4033904FDOQ4033904
Authors: Michael D. Whinston, Patrick Bolton
Publication date: 16 May 1993
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297815
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- Vertical integration with endogenous contract leadership: stability and fair profit allocation
- Ship-to-order supplies: contract breachability and the impact of a manufacturer-owned direct channel
- Vertical integration as a source of hold-up
- Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium
- A note on partial vertical integration
- Inefficient ownership and resale opportunities
- Customized transportation, equity participation, and cooperation performance within logistics supply chains
- Vertical integration and right of first refusal
- Vertical contracting with endogenous market structure
- The horizontal scope of the firm: organizational tradeoffs vs. Buyer-supplier relationships
- Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade
- Incorporating unawareness into contract theory
- Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
- A price theory of vertical and lateral integration
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