Using an iterated prisoner's dilemma with exit option to study alliance behavior: results of a tournament and simulation

DOI10.1007/S10588-005-5589-3MaRDI QIDQ853666zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Steven E. Phelan, Richard J. Arend, Darryl A. Seale

Publication date 17 November 2006

Published in Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10588-005-5589-3

zbMATH Keywords

game theorytournamentstrategic alliancesopportunism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3135430 (Why is no real title available?)
• Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm
• When Competition Eclipses Cooperation: An Event History Analysis of Joint Venture Failure

Cited in

(4)

• Evolution of cooperation through aspiration-based adjustment of interaction range in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
• Possibility of strategic alliance from competition: a game analysis
• External pressure on alliances: what does the prisoners' dilemma reveal?
• Stability analysis of R\&D cooperation in a supply chain

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