The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.11.025MaRDI QIDQ1046252zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David R. Collie, Helmuts Āzacis

Publication date 21 December 2009

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2007_27.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cartelscollusionoptimal punishmentstrigger strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

Cited in

(11)

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
• Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints
• The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames
• Optimal punishments with detection lags
• A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames
• Punishing greediness in divide-the-dollar games
• Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• Marginal costs and collusive sustainability
• Individual best response in the repeated Cournot model

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