Discounting-sensitivity in symmetric repeated games: an example

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2019.10.010MaRDI QIDQ2294519zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shiran Rachmilevitch

Publication date 11 February 2020

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.10.010

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamessymmetric equilibriumsymmetric games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

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Cites work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Game theory
• On the existence of symmetric mixed strategy equilibria
• Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria

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