Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A Class of Sequential Games
- A new solution to the random assignment problem.
- Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
- Booster draft mechanisms for multi-object assignment
- Can everyone benefit from growth ? Two difficulties
- Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
- Consistency in house allocation problems
- Efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences
- Equilibria in sequential allocation
- Fair division of indivisible items
- Manipulating picking sequences
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
- Obvious manipulations
- Prisoners' Dilemama and Professional Sports Drafts
- Queue allocation of indivisible goods
- Round-robin beyond additive agents: existence and fairness of approximate equilibria
- Serial dictatorship and Pareto optimality
- Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
- Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
- Strategy-proofness makes the difference: deferred-acceptance with responsive priorities
- Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
- Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
This page was built for publication: Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7286801)
