Booster draft mechanisms for multi-object assignment

DOI10.1007/S00182-026-00981-7MaRDI QIDQ6850256zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Gian Caspari

Publication date 3 March 2026

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-026-00981-7

zbMATH Keywords

booster draftenvy-freematchingmulti-object assignment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites work

• Centralized allocation in multiple markets
• Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation
• Fair division of indivisible items
• Fair division of indivisible items among people with similar preferences
• Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity
• Measurement Theory
• On cores and indivisibility
• Serial rules in a multi-unit Shapley-Scarf market
• Strategy-proof, efficient, and nonbossy quota allocations
• Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems
• Strategyproof exchange of indivisible goods.
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem

Cited in

(2)

• Efficiency in multiple-type housing markets
• Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules

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