Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization (Q2641198)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4189424
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| English | Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4189424 |
Statements
Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization (English)
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1991
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Let A be a set of social outcomes and N a finite set of voters. For every profile of preferences R, a social choice function f associates a choice set f(R). A game form G implements f in strong Nash equilibria if the set of strong Nash equilibria of G equals f(R) for every R. This paper gives sufficient conditions on A and f for such implementation.
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implementation
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social choice correspondence
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social outcomes
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game form
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strong Nash equilibria
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0.8406050801277161
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0.8402649760246277
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0.8364875316619873
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0.8285841345787048
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0.8235439658164978
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