Waitlist engineering in discrete object allocations with outside option

DOI10.1007/S00182-025-00923-9MaRDI QIDQ6992115zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan, Eray Cumbul

Publication date 28 April 2025

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-025-00923-9

zbMATH Keywords

allocationmatchingmechanismstrategy-proofnesssure stabilitywaitlist

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• A dynamic school choice model
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Common enrollment in school choice
• Equilibrium Allocations Under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence From Deceased Donor Kidneys
• Influencing waiting lists
• Kidney Exchange
• Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
• The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets

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