The two-sided matching problem. Origin, development and current issues

DOI10.1142/S0219198901000373MaRDI QIDQ2772855zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Gale

Publication date 19 February 2002

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198901000373

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings
• Graphs and Marriages
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners

Cited in

(8)

• Satisfied two-sided matching: a method considering elation and disappointment of agents
• Bipartite choices
• ReGale: some memorable results
• A number of stable matchings in models of the Gale-Shapley type
• Finding all stable pairs and solutions to the many-to-many stable matching problem
• A note on a two-sided discrete-concave market with possibly bounded salaries
• Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
• A surgical scheduling method considering surgeons' preferences

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