Generalized matchings for preferences represented by simplest semiorder: stability and Pareto optimality

DOI10.1134/S0005117914060071MaRDI QIDQ891210zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors S. G. Kisel'gof

Publication date 16 November 2015

Published in Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117914060071

zbMATH Keywords

generalized Gale-Shapley matchingsPareto optimalitytwo-sided market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Optimality conditions (49K99) Applications of optimal control and differential games (49N90) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination
• Simple and simplest semi-orders
• Utility Maximization, Choice and Preference

Cited in

(1)

• Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences

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