On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
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Publication:1787585
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2018.03.022zbMATH Open1397.91240OpenAlexW2793064206MaRDI QIDQ1787585FDOQ1787585
Authors: Ata Atay, Tamás Solymosi 
Publication date: 5 October 2018
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://real.mtak.hu/75324/1/MTDP1805.pdf
Recommendations
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)
Cites Work
- The assignment game. I: The core
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- The bargaining set of four-person balanced games
- On Some Network Flow Games
- Cores of partitioning games
- On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games
- The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets
- The core of an \(m\)-sided assignment game
- The supplier-firm-buyer game and its \(m\)-sided generalization
- An advantage of the bargaining set over the core
- Multisided matching games with complementarities
- Bargaining sets and the core in partitioning games
Cited In (5)
- Game theoretic analysis of the bargaining process over a long-term replenishment contract
- Buyer-Supplier Games: Optimization over the Core
- Buyer-supplier games: optimization over the core
- Matching markets with middlemen under transferable utility
- A buyer - seller game model for selection and negotiation of purchasing bids on interval data
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