Near-optimal auctions on independence systems

DOI10.1007/S00224-024-10189-5MaRDI QIDQ6635693FDOQ6635693

Authors: Sabrina C. L. Ammann, Sebastian Stiller 

Publication date: 12 November 2024

Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

machine learningapproximation algorithmsmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Understanding machine learning. From theory to algorithms
• Optimal Auction Design
• Neural Network Learning
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The sample complexity of auctions with side information
• The sample complexity of revenue maximization
• Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
• Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization

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