Near-optimal auctions on independence systems

DOI10.1007/S00224-024-10189-5MaRDI QIDQ6635693zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Sabrina C. L. Ammann, Sebastian Stiller

Publication date 12 November 2024

Published in Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

machine learningapproximation algorithmsmechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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• On optimal single-item auctions
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6381703 (Why is no real title available?)
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Neural Network Learning
• Optimal Auction Design
• Settling the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization
• The sample complexity of auctions with side information
• The sample complexity of revenue maximization
• Understanding machine learning. From theory to algorithms

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