Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
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Publication:4262867
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00082zbMath0947.91052MaRDI QIDQ4262867
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B38: Production theory, theory of the firm
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91B42: Consumer behavior, demand theory
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