Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm
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Publication:4262867
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00082zbMATH Open0947.91052MaRDI QIDQ4262867FDOQ4262867
Publication date: 4 June 2000
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)
Cited In (18)
- The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
- Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach
- Price discrimination and majority voting
- Regulating risk-averse producers: the case of complementary products
- Hamiltonian approach to multi-dimensional screening
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- Optimal three-part tariff pricing with Spence-Mirrlees reservation prices
- A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design
- Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
- Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
- Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
- Large-Scale Bundle-Size Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis
- Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
- Multi-buyer discount pricing
- Prices versus auctions in large markets
- Computing prices for target profits in contracts
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