Price Discrimination by a Many-Product Firm

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00082zbMATH Open0947.91052MaRDI QIDQ4262867FDOQ4262867

Authors Mark Armstrong 

Publication date 4 June 2000

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

multiproduct firmoptimal selling strategyoptimal nonlinear tariffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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Cited in

(21)

• Optimal three-part tariff pricing with Spence-Mirrlees reservation prices
• Large-scale bundle-size pricing: a theoretical analysis
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Price discrimination of digital content
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Multi-buyer discount pricing
• Strength in numbers: robust mechanisms for public goods with many agents
• Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
• Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
• Computing prices for target profits in contracts
• Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
• Cheap talk comparisons in multi-issue bargaining
• Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach
• Hamiltonian approach to multi-dimensional screening
• When two-part tariffs are not enough: mixing with nonlinear pricing
• Regulating risk-averse producers: the case of complementary products
• Prices versus auctions in large markets
• Price discrimination and majority voting
• Consumer heterogeneity and surplus under two-part pricing
• A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design

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