A modified version of Arrow's IIA condition

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01241-7MaRDI QIDQ2179461zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eric Maskin

Publication date 12 May 2020

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01241-7

zbMATH Keywords

electionsvote splittingArrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives conditionvoters' preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5308074
• Independent Decisiveness and the Arrow theorem
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Cites work

• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(3)

• The Borda count with weak preferences
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited

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