A modified version of Arrow's IIA condition

DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01241-7zbMath1437.91190OpenAlexW3008595590MaRDI QIDQ2179461

Eric S. Maskin

Publication date: 12 May 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01241-7

zbMATH Keywords

electionsvote splittingArrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives conditionvoters' preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Implementation in differential information economies ⋮ The Borda count with weak preferences

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Unnamed Item

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