A modified version of Arrow's IIA condition

DOI10.1007/S00355-020-01241-7zbMATH Open1437.91190OpenAlexW3008595590MaRDI QIDQ2179461FDOQ2179461

Authors: Eric Maskin 

Publication date: 12 May 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01241-7

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zbMATH Keywords

electionsvote splittingArrow's independence of irrelevant alternatives conditionvoters' preference

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

Cited In (3)

• The Borda count with weak preferences
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
• Implementation in differential information economies

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