Prophet secretary through blind strategies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2235156
DOI10.1007/s10107-020-01544-8zbMath1474.60113arXiv1807.07483OpenAlexW3137376340MaRDI QIDQ2235156
Raimundo Saona, José R. Correa, Bruno Ziliotto
Publication date: 20 October 2021
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.07483
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Comparison of threshold stop rules and maximum for independent nonnegative random variables
- Stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables: A complete comparison by conjugate duality
- Comparisons of stop rule and supremum expectations of i.i.d. random variables
- Convex functions, partial orderings, and statistical applications
- Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design
- Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing
- From pricing to prophets, and back!
- Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
- Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs
- Prophet Secretary
- Optimal Auction Design
- Semiamarts and finite values
- Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets
- Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
- Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information
- Matroid prophet inequalities
This page was built for publication: Prophet secretary through blind strategies
