Computing optimal incentives via bilevel programming
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 432976 (Why is no real title available?)
- A necessary and a sufficient optimality condition for bilevel programming problems
- A necessary and sufficient regularity condition to have bounded multipliers in nonconvex programming
- Convex two-level optimization
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- Directional Derivatives for Extremal-Value Functions with Applications to the Completely Convex Case
- Directional differentiability of optimal solutions under Slater's condition
- Double penalty method for bilevel optimization problems
- Entrepreneurial Ability, Venture Investments, and Risk Sharing
- Existence of optimal solutions to mathematical programs with equilibrium constraints
- Introduction to sensitivity and stability analysis in nonlinear programming
- Minimization of Locally Lipschitzian Functions
Cited in
(9)- Application of multi-objective programming in the research of agent incentive
- Globally convergent homotopy algorithm for solving the KKT systems to the principal-agent bilevel programming
- A modified homotopy method for solving the principal-agent bilevel programming problem
- A method for solving principal-agent problems via the satisfactory degree of bilevel programming problem
- Quasidifferntiability of optimal solutions in parametric optimal solutions in parametric nonlinear optimization
- Bilevel optimization: theory, algorithms, applications and a bibliography
- Bilevel convex programming models
- Solving nonlinear principal-agent problems using bilevel programming
- Sample average approximation for the continuous type principal-agent problem
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