A neo\(^ 2\) Bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero- sum games

DOI10.1007/BF01242948zbMath0817.90147OpenAlexW1514445261MaRDI QIDQ1341440

Salvatore Modica, David Schmeidler, Sergiu Hart

Publication date: 16 February 1995

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01242948

zbMATH Keywords

conditional actsjoint derivation of utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) 2-person games (91A05) Individual preferences (91B08) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (4)

On minimax and Pareto optimal security payoffs in multicriteria games ⋮ Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm ⋮ Characterizations of the value of matrix games ⋮ Dynamic variational preferences

Cites Work

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• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
• Some formal problems with the Von Neumann and Morgenstern theory of two- persons, zero-sum games. I: The direct proof
• A note on the maximin value of two-person, zero-sum games
• Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
• A characterization of the value of zero-sum two-person games
• Axiomatic Definition of the Value of a Matrix Game
• Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle
• A Definition of Subjective Probability

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