A neo^ 2 Bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero- sum games
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A neo\(^ 2\) Bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero- sum games
A neo\(^ 2\) Bayesian foundation of the maxmin value for two-person zero- sum games
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Cites work
- A characterization of the value of zero-sum two-person games
- A Definition of Subjective Probability
- A note on the maximin value of two-person, zero-sum games
- Axiomatic Definition of the Value of a Matrix Game
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1154012 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Some formal problems with the Von Neumann and Morgenstern theory of two- persons, zero-sum games. I: The direct proof
- Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle
- Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
Cited in
(7)- A derivation of expected utilty maximization in the context of a game
- Characterizations of the value of matrix games
- On minimax and Pareto optimal security payoffs in multicriteria games
- Dynamic variational preferences
- Ambiguity and the Bayesian paradigm
- A theorem of the maximin and applications to Bayesian zero-sum games
- Moral hazard, the Savage framework, and state-dependent utility
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