Aggregate information, common knowledge and agreeing not to bet
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Publication:532512
DOI10.1007/s00182-010-0226-xzbMath1274.91086MaRDI QIDQ532512
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0226-x
91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
91A60: Probabilistic games; gambling
Cites Work
- Information, trade and common knowledge
- We can't disagree forever
- Agreeing to disagree
- Consensus by identifying extremists
- Disagreement is unpredictable.
- Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
- Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
- Common Knowledge of a Multivariate Aggregate Statistic