Consumer returns reduction and information revelation mechanism for a supply chain
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Publication:512923
DOI10.1007/S10479-014-1592-8zbMATH Open1360.90041OpenAlexW2011039067MaRDI QIDQ512923FDOQ512923
Authors: Tiaojun Xiao, Jing Shi
Publication date: 3 March 2017
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-014-1592-8
Recommendations
- The impacts of the full returns policy on a supply chain with information asymmetry
- Information Disclosure Model Under Supply Chain Competition with Asymmetric Demand Disruption
- Store assistance and coordination of supply chains facing consumer's return
- Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor
- The impact of sharing customer returns information in a supply chain with and without a buyback policy
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)
Cites Work
- Game theory
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- Capacity choice and allocation: strategic behavior and supply chain performance
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- Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
- Contracting with asymmetric cost information in a dual-channel supply chain
- Coordinating a supply chain with a quality assurance policy via a revenue-sharing contract
- A two-stage supply chain with demand sensitive to price, delivery time, and reliability of delivery
- The impacts of the full returns policy on a supply chain with information asymmetry
- Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor
- A dynamic model for optimal design quality and return policies
Cited In (16)
- Fit revelation strategy in a supply chain with two types of consumers
- Ordering and returns handling decisions and coordination in a supply chain with demand uncertainty
- Disclosure of quality preference-revealing information in a supply chain with competitive products
- Store-assistance management for a supply chain with consumer return under consignment contract
- Sourcing strategies of manufacturers with customer returns and product design efforts
- Retailer's rationale to refuse consumer returns in supply chains
- Pricing, environmental governance efficiency, and channel coordination in a socially responsible tourism supply chain
- ``Buy online, pick up in store under fit uncertainty: to offer or not to offer
- How corporate social responsibility auditing interacts with supply chain information transparency
- Optimal advance selling strategy with information provision for omni-channel retailers
- Quality disclosure strategy in a decentralized supply chain with consumer returns
- Information disclosure strategies for the intermediary and competitive sellers
- Store assistance and coordination of supply chains facing consumer's return
- Mechanism design in a supply chain with ambiguity in private information
- The impacts of the full returns policy on a supply chain with information asymmetry
- Advance selling with part prepayment and consumer returns
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