Mechanism design in a supply chain with ambiguity in private information

DOI10.3934/jimo.2018151zbMath1438.90214MaRDI QIDQ2338475

Feimin Zhong, Zhongbao Zhou, Wei Zeng

Publication date: 21 November 2019

Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2018151

zbMATH Keywords

supply chain management; information asymmetry; incentive compatible; information ambiguity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A80: Applications of game theory

90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives

90B05: Inventory, storage, reservoirs

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