Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules

DOI10.1145/3564246.3585233WikidataQ130862739 ScholiaQ130862739MaRDI QIDQ6499262FDOQ6499262

Authors: Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira, David C. Parkes 

Publication date: 8 May 2024

zbMATH Keywords

pricingmarket designorder executionfront-runningdecentralized exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

• Gnosis
• Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable
• Ouroboros: a provably secure proof-of-stake blockchain protocol
• The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response *
• Order-fairness for Byzantine consensus
• Algorand: a secure and efficient distributed ledger
• Credible Auctions: A Trilemma
• Differential privacy in constant function market makers

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