Credible decentralized exchange design via verifiable sequencing rules

DOI10.1145/3564246.3585233MaRDI QIDQ6499262zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira, David C. Parkes

Publication date 8 May 2024

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/3564246.3585233

zbMATH Keywords

decentralized exchangefront-runningmarket designorder executionpricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites work

• Algorand: a secure and efficient distributed ledger
• Credible auctions: a trilemma
• Differential privacy in constant function market makers
• Gnosis
• Majority is not enough: bitcoin mining is vulnerable
• Order-fairness for Byzantine consensus
• Ouroboros: a provably secure proof-of-stake blockchain protocol
• The high-frequency trading arms race: frequent batch auctions as a market design response

Cited in

(2)

• Discrete and Bayesian transaction fee mechanisms
• Transaction fee mechanism design

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