Participation and exclusion in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.01.031zbMATH Open1321.91055OpenAlexW2052796569MaRDI QIDQ500495FDOQ500495

Authors: Harrison H. C. Cheng 

Publication date: 5 October 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.031

Recommendations

• Participation in auctions
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
• Auctions with selective entry
• A study of participation in dynamic auctions
• Participation and welfare in auctions with default
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3939034
• Auctions with financial externalities
• Auctions with endogenous entry
• Competitive auctions

zbMATH Keywords

participationexclusionBulow-Klemperer theorempayoff comparisonsingle crossing property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result

Cited In (5)

• A note on the exclusion principle
• Participation and welfare in auctions with default
• Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion
• A note on low-price menu auctions
• Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers

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