Participation and exclusion in auctions

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.031zbMath1321.91055OpenAlexW2052796569MaRDI QIDQ500495

Harrison H. C. Cheng

Publication date: 5 October 2015

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.01.031

zbMATH Keywords

participationexclusionBulow-Klemperer theorempayoff comparisonsingle crossing property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result
• Optimal Auction Design

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