Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.11.001MaRDI QIDQ1940397zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paulo Monteiro, Frank H. jun. Page, B. F. Svaiter

Publication date 6 March 2013

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10438/641

zbMATH Keywords

multidimensional typesoptimal auctionstypes exclusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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(6)

• A note on the exclusion principle
• Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
• Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types
• On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening
• Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities

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