Optimal auctions with multidimensional types and the desirability of exclusion

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.11.001zbMATH Open1260.91108OpenAlexW2051698059MaRDI QIDQ1940397FDOQ1940397

Authors: Paulo Monteiro, Frank H. jun. Page, B. F. Svaiter 

Publication date: 6 March 2013

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/641

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zbMATH Keywords

multidimensional typesoptimal auctionstypes exclusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cited In (6)

• A note on the exclusion principle
• Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
• Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types
• On the optimality of exclusion in multi-dimensional screening
• Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities

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