Manipulability of choice aggregations
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Cites work
- A non-dictatorial compromise
- Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
- Competitive Stability under Weak Gross Substitutability: The "Euclidean Distance" Approach
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091137 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- New problems in the general choice theory
Cited in
(9)- Manipulation of choice (agenda theory)
- Discrete decision theory: manipulations
- Topological manipulators form an ultrafilter
- Network topology design to influence the effects of manipulative behaviors in a social choice procedure
- The difference between manipulability indices in the IC and IANC models
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5501205 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 726886 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulability of majoritarian procedures in two-dimensional Downsian model
- Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
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