Pairwise stability in a two-sided matching market with indivisible goods and money

DOI10.15807/JORSJ.54.1zbMATH Open1228.91053OpenAlexW1543962930MaRDI QIDQ3171494FDOQ3171494

Authors: Yasir Ali, Rashid Farooq 

Publication date: 5 October 2011

Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.15807/jorsj.54.1

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorystable matchingindivisible goodsmarriage model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Cited In (7)

• Pairwise stability in two sided market with strictly increasing valuation functions
• Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets
• Choice function-based two-sided markets: stability, lattice property, path independence and algorithms
• Real indeterminacy of stationary equilibria in matching models with divisible money
• Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets

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