Household behavior and the marriage market
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Publication:2439910
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- A behavioral two‐sex marriage model
- Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Efficient Intra-Household Allocations and Distribution Factors: Implications and Identification
- Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests
- Endogenous household interaction
- Household Intertemporal Behaviour: A Collective Characterization and a Test of Commitment
- Rational Household Labor Supply
Cited in
(12)- The law of large numbers for large stable matchings
- ACCOUNTING FOR THE TIMING OF FIRST MARRIAGE*
- Spending time and money within the household
- Marriage, divorce, and asymmetric information
- Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations
- Marriage, markets, and money: a Coasian theory of household formation
- On the empirical content of the Beckerian marriage model
- Warfare induces post-marital residence change
- Endogenous household interaction
- Marriage, labor supply, and home production
- MALE AND FEMALE MARRIAGE RETURNS TO SCHOOLING
- Rational Household Labor Supply
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