Marriage, divorce, and asymmetric information

DOI10.1111/IERE.12086MaRDI QIDQ2935190zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Leora Friedberg, Steven E. Stern

Publication date 22 December 2014

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12086

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationbargaining modeldivorceinterdependent utilitymarriage

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Utility theory (91B16)

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Cites work

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• Semiparametric estimates of the supply and demand effects of disability on labor force participation
• Semiparametric Estimation of Index Coefficients
• Semiparametric Estimation of Monotone and Concave Utility Functions for Polychotomous Choice Models
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
• Unbiased determination of production technologies

Cited in

(4)

• Fairness and inefficient divorce
• Over-investment in marriage-specific capital
• The dissolution of marriages: The role of information and marital‐specific capital
• Please, Marry Me! An Experimental Study of Risking a Joint Venture

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